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LONG OVERDUE-PROCESS: CALIFORNIA AND
THE LAY JUDGE
The Supreme Court of California in Gordon v. Justice
Court' unanimously held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is violated when a non-attorney judge
presides at a criminal trial in which there is a possibility of
incarceration. The decision, one which portends a major exten-
sion of due process rights to criminal defendants, is not based
upon novel or complicated legal theories; the court's reasoning
flows easily and naturally from a long line of Supreme Court
decisions on defendants' right to counsel in criminal prosecu-
tions. What is startling is the infrequency with which'this par-
ticular issue has been raised prior to the California decision.
The lay justice has been a part of the common law tradi-
tion for nearly six centuries, and has been the subject of contro-
versy for almost as long. Yet, until the Gordon court dealt him
a nearly fatal blow, no state court of last resort had ever before
questioned his viability. Final resolution of his fate rests with
the United States Supreme Court, which now has an opportun-
ity to lay this old gentleman to rest. If it does so, the right to a
fair trial for all criminal defendants will more fully become a
part of the living law.
I. BRIEF HISTORICAL CRITIQUE
A thorough historical treatment of the lay justice is beyond
the scope of this comment. It is instructive, however, to consult
early English law for the purpose of ascertaining the qualities
originally hoped for in such justices.
The justice of the peace, the best known of today's lay
judges, had a noble birth-a birth, as early English law sug-
gests, attended by great expectations. As early as 1195, Herbert
Walker, the Justiciar, issued a proclamation calling for certain
knights to receive and hand over to the sheriff all prisoners
arrested.2 The knights were to aid, in other ways as well, the
preservation of the peace. Two decades later, the Magna Carta
1 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. California
v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974) (No. 74-772).
2 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 286 (3d ed. 1922-23).
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provided that "[w]e will not make men justices, constables,
sheriffs or bailiffs unless they are such as know the law of the
realm, and are minded to observe it rightly."'
The office evolved until, in 1344, a statute conferring fe-
lony jurisdiction on justices provided that:
two or three of the best reputation in the counties shall be
assigned Keepers of the Peace by the King's Commission;
and at what time shall need be, the same, with others wise
and learned in the law, shall be assigned by the King's Com-
mission to hear and determine felonies and trespasses done
against the peace in the same counties, and to inflict punish-
ment reasonably according to [law and reason and] the
manner of the deed.'
The commission5 of Justice of the Peace was refined in
1590, then assuming the form substantially followed in modem
times. The justices in each county were supervised by the
custos rotolorum7 who appointed a trained law clerk for them.,
The jurisdiction of the justices extended to both misdemeanors
and felonies, but they were instructed to leave the "difficult"
cases for Assizes.' Because they were held four times a year, the
justice courts came to be known as "quarter sessions.""0 The
commission from the Crown provided that certain judges (the
"quorum") were to be present, the original intention being that
qualified lawyers would attend all sessions.1" In time and by
custom, however, all judges came to be of the quorum. 12 There
were, therefore, sessions at which no professionals were pres-
ent."3
Because the justices had no jurisdiction over treasons, and
3 MAGNA CARTA § 45.
Maudsley & Davies, The Justice of the Peace in England, 18 U. MImu L. REv.
517, 519 (1964).
5 "Commission" can be read as "office." The Crown commissioned certain persons
to be justices of the peace and the commission defined their obligations to the Crown.
1 W. HoLnSwoxRT, supra note 2, at 290.
Translation is "the keeper of the rolls of our peace." Id.
'Id.
G. CRoss & G. HAND, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 195 (5th ed. 1971).
' Id.
"Id.
12 Id.
' _Id.
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because it became traditional by the eighteenth century to
send all capital cases to Assizes, the justices came to exercise
primarily misdemeanor jurisdiction. 4 Even earlier, in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, commissions of the peace
were being issued separately for certain boroughs within coun-
ties.15 The procedure followed in the boroughs was similar to
that of county quarter sessions, but eventually salaried lawyers
came to act as sole judges of the courts. 6 Where borough ses-
sions were established, they often excluded the jurisdiction of
the county magistrates.
1 7
From their creation until the latter part of the nineteenth
century, 8 the justices took on, mainly through statutory provi-
sions, more and more of the administrative duties of local gov-
ernment.' 9 At the same time, their judicial duties were some-
what curtailed and put into more capable hands. However,
because lay judges were deemed essential to the English judi-
cial system, they were retained, albeit subject to higher qualifi-
cations. By 1966, all magistrates in the United Kingdom were
required to undergo a prescribed course of training both before
and during the first year of office.2" And, though all county
justices today have a vote in the sentencing procedure, the
presiding judge who takes evidence and instructs the jury is an
attorney, as is, more often than not, the deputy chairman of
quarter sessions.2'
What emerges from this meager historical sketch is clear
evidence of an abiding concern that the justices be knowledgea-
ble in the law. Unfortunately, in both the English and Ameri-
can legal systems, theory and practice have often diverged.
The literature of England abounds with references to the
magistrates' ignorance and corruption. Tobias Smollet de-
scribed them as "men of profligate lives, needy, mean, igno-
rant, and rapacious. '22 Swift offered that "these worthy magis-
"Id.
" Id. at 196.
I Id. at 196, 337.
' Id. at 196.
, 1 W. HoLDswORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 286-92 (3d ed. 1922-23).
" Id. at 288-89.
21 G. CROSS & G. HAND, supra note 9, at 337.
21 Id.
2 Palmer, The Vestigial Justice of the Peace, 47 A.B.A.J. 380, 382 (1961).
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trates, instead of lessening enormities, are the occasion of just
twice as much debauchery as there would be without them."
' '
Horace Walpole thought it a sound wager that "the greatest
criminals of this town are the officers of justice."' Henry
Fielding, who served as justice and chairman of Westminster
quarter sessions in the 1880's, was fond of satirizing, to great
effect, the intellectual inadequacies of his colleagues .25 And the
criticism has continued in modern England:
We have seen in almost every other sphere an increasing de-
mand for the "qualified" person, the man or woman who
possesses a degree or a diploma. . . . Newly-qualified doc-
tors have to spend a year in hospital before they can go into
private practice. Teachers' training colleges in England are
giving three-year courses instead of two. . . . Justices'
clerks, with comparatively few exceptions, are now whole
time professionals; a higher standard of education and train-
ing is demanded of policemen, probation officers and social
workers. By contrast, the lay justice . . . stands out as a
glorious anachronism."
The lay justice came to America with the English colo-
nists, and in the early years he served them well enough: "As
in a primitive society, the problem was to settle disputes
among neighbors and to prevent friction where possible."
' '
There was little law and it was uncomplicated; in any case,
there were few lawyers available for the task of keeping a court
open in every village and settlement.3
Today, however, the United States is a highly complex
industrial society which has developed legal precepts to deal
with every imaginable dispute that may take shape in such a
setting. Conflicting state and federal law, a virtual legal mo-
rass, can be likened to Jorge Luis Borge's "Library of Babel."2
SId.
2, Id. at 383.
" Id. at 381.
2A Chairman of Quarter Sessions, The Lay Justice: Some Criticism and Sugges-
tions, CPum. L. REv. (Eng.) 657-58 (1961).
2Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REV.
118 (1927).
23 Id.
" Borge's books contained all possible permutations of the alphabet and thus
every conceivable answer to every conceivable question. But the discovery of a single
answer compelled a life-long search among a universe of shelves.
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A solid grounding in the law obviously is needed in order to
understand and resolve the many complex questions arising in
the course of a trial. Constitutional rights and protections have
expanded, much to the credit of the legal system, requiring
constant vigilance on the part of all who have contact with the
criminal justice system. Moreover, the nation no longer suffers
from a dearth of lawyers; law school graduates are increasing
at a rate which alarms the profession. 0 However functional the
lay judge may have been in an earlier and less intricate legal
system, he has become a vestige-and an unnecessary one-in
the body of the law. Reliance upon lay judges seems indefensi-
ble when legally-trained individuals are available to handle the
complexities which arise in a trial setting. Consider the diffi-
culties of the lay justice:
[I]t would indeed be strange if a justice of the peace did not
treat each case as a unique proposition. He has no category
or class into which he may place it, no analysis from which
to draw to solve the new problem before him. . . . Wholly
unlike the judge who is trained in the law, he has no preced-
ents to guide him. . . . He cannot call on the legal experience
of the ages to assist him but is helpless to do any more than
apply his own personal notions of right and wrong to the case
at hand."
Nothing illustrates the shortcomings of the lay justice
more graphically than the testimony elicited from a magistrate
in the Kentucky case of North v. Russell.2 Defendant North
contended in his appeal that his fourteenth amendment due
process right to a fair trail was violated because his case was
tried before a judge who had no legal training.n The following
exchange occurred at the habeas corpus proceeding in Harlan
Circuit Court between defendant's counsel (Goss) and the
magistrate (Russell) who presided at North's trial:3
"Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A.J. 146 (1972).3' Smith, supra note 2, at 127-28.
516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1974) (per curiam), vacated and remanded for further
consideration, 95 S.Ct. 673 (1974) (Mem.).
33 Woolley, Local Courts on Trial, The Courier-Journal & Times, September 15,
1974, § E at 1, col. 2.
U Id., § E at 1, col. 4 continuing to p. 6, col. 1. The material quoted from The
Courier-Journal & Times is without corrections for grammar or style.
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Goss: Are you familiar with the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, and as to what it pro-
vides?
Russell: Yes, sir.
Goss: What does that provide?
Russell: Right off hand, I don't . . . something about judi-
cial. I think one of them is judicial procedure or something
or another. I'm not for sure.
Goss: Are you familiar with the term "due process of law" or
"equal protection of the law"?
Russell: Yes, sir.
Goss: In legal meaning?
Russell: No, that's beyond me.
Goss: Are you familiar with the rights accorded to a defen-
dant as accused in a criminal case under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America?
Russell: Mr. Goss, as I previous said, I don't know, exactly
understand this Fourteenth Amendment. I know part of it.
Goss: What is your understanding with respect to the effect
that a judge should give between conflicting rulings made by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the
United States of America? Do you understand the question?
Russell: No, I really don't. I don't think I know, if it would
go to the Supreme Court from the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals. Is that what you're referring to?
Goss: Yes.
Russell: Well, I just don't . . . As I say, there's a lot of cases
the Supreme Court rules on I don't agree.
Goss: Are you a licensed lawyer?
Russell: No, sir.
The ultimate insult to "ordered justice" in North was that
the defendant, charged with his first offense of driving while
intoxicated,3s was sentenced to imprisonment,31 a penalty not
provided for under the statute: fine is the only punishment
prescribed.3 7 In the state of Kentucky, only 70 (or 7.5%) of 933
" Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.520(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
" Woolley, supra note 33, at 6, col. 2.
" KRS § 189.990(9)(a) (Supp. 1972) provides: "Any person who violates subsec-
tion (2) of KRS § 189.520 shall be fined, for the first offense, not less than $100 or more
than $500. .. ."
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63
inferior court judges having trial jurisdiction are attorneys.3 1
Thus, the intolerable conditions demonstrated by the North
tetimony can be expected to repeat themselves time and again
across the state of Kentucky and other states where lay judges
retain trial jurisdiction.
39
I1. CASE LAW
There are very few court decisions prior to the California
Supreme Court ruling on the issue under consideration. A thor-
ough search has revealed only five state courts of last resort and
one federal district court that directly deal with the question,"
and all but two of these courts have entirely begged the ques-
tion before them. A federal constitutional claim cannot be an-
swered by mere recitation of state constitutional and statutory
provisions on the qualifications of judges. Yet this is the pri-
Is This information was obtained by a telephone survey of Kentucky's 120 county
clerks in cooperation with Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, Inc. of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky, during September 1974. A further breakdown of the data col-
lected may be obtained from this organization.
11 See, e.g., THE INsTrruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMSTRATON, INC., THE JUSTIcE OF THE
PEACE TODAY (1965, Supp. 1973) (showing states where justices retain trial jurisdic-
tion); Brief for National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, appendix,
Gordon v. Justice Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (showing states where
lay judges retain trial jurisdiction).
0 These cases are discussed infra. Two other cases, though not dealing directly
with the issue, are worthy of note. In Bendheim Bros. v. Baldwin, 73 Ga. 594 (1884),
the Georgia Supreme Court said that "[tihe law does not require a justice of the peace
to charge the jury at all; his ignorance of the law, as well as propriety, would seem to
demand that he should not .... "
In Smith v. Tuman, 114 N.W.2d 73 at 76-77 (Minn. 1962), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, construing a statute providing for removal from proceedings in a justice
court, noted:
These statutes reflect respected opinion to the effect that the trial of an
action before a layman whose judicial work is a sideline activity is not consis-
tent with the modem view of the sound administration of justice.
The court, in a footnote, then quoted with approval Professor Pirsig's comment that:
[t]he notion of a layman, ignorant of the law, deciding the legal rights of
parties in civil litigation and of defendants in criminal cases is wholly irre-
concilable with the fundamental tenet of our government that justice shall
be administered in accordance with established principles of law and not at
the whim, or caprice or personal notions of justice held by some individual
exercising the power of the state. The fact that the amount in litigation is
small or that the crimes charged are minor ones does not in a democratic
society alter the application of this fundamental philosophy.
Id. at 77.
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mary approach taken by four of the six courts which have en-
tertained the lay judge issue.
A. The First Decisions
In Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court,1 the defendant
claimed due process denial because the jury was instructed by
a non-attorney judge. The Arizona Court of Appeals first deter-
mined that under state law the justice had the power to in-
struct the jury.42 Thereafter, the court found that the issue
raised was non-meritorious, citing three Supreme Court cases
as authority. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,43 said
the Arizona court, defined due process as a denial of "funda-
mental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice."44
Citing Beck v. Washington45 the court noted that the four-
teenth amendment does not assure immunity from judicial
error. 6 Then, in a masterful demonstration of circuity, the
court quoted from Snyder v. Massachusetts4 7 as its final answer
to the question raised: 8
A state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accord-
ance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in
so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.
The essence of the question was whether the particular proce-
dure under attack did indeed violate due process. This issue
was never squarely met.
In State v. Lynch,49 the question was again raised, this
time in Arizona's highest court. The defendant entered a plea
of guilty after a preliminary hearing before a justice. On appli-
cation for writ of habeas corpus, defendant contended that
because the presiding judge at the preliminary hearing was not
" 440 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
42 Id. at 1005.
361 U.S. 234 (1960).
" Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 440 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
a 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
" Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 440 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
7 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
"Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 440 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
" 489 P.2d 697 (Ariz. 1971).
1975]
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a lawyer, he was denied due process of law." The Arizona Su-
preme Court answered by reciting state statutes which set out
qualifications for justices of the peace, noting the absence of a
bar membership requirement.5 1 If this was not sufficiently con-
vincing, the court then cited as controlling the lower Arizona
Court of Appeals decision in Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court!52
In Decatur v. Kushmer,53 defendant raised the lay judge
issue for the first time on appeal. The Illinois court set out the
state constitutional and statutory provisions which, while re-
quiring all judges and magistrates to be attorneys, excepted
magistrates from this requirement in certain instances.54 The
court noted that defendant's trial for violation of a city ordi-
nance was one of these exceptions," which avoided the issue
before the court. The court's decision, however, seemed to be
based more on the fact that defendant offered no authority in
support of his contention; therefore, said the court, "[h]is
generalized argument must be rejected."5 Perhaps one cannot
fault the Illinois court for refusing to take too seriously an issue
raised initially on appeal, in support of which appellant offered
no authority or argumentation.
Melikian v. Avent57 originated when Melikian, delinquent
in a bill payment, had a default judgment entered against him
in a justice court. He brought an action to enjoin execution of
judgment on the grounds that justice courts were unconstitu-
tional for two reasons: (1) justices favor plaintiffs for patronage
reasons because venue may be laid in more than one court and
(2) justices are not required to be attorneys.5 8
The Mississippi federal district court, after distinguishing
petitioner's first claim from the Supreme Court's decision in
Tumey v. Ohio,5" proceeded to summarily dismiss plaintiff's
second contention:
"Id. at 697-98.
" Id. at 698.
52 Id.
- 253 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1969).
" Id. at 428.
.Id.
"Id.
17 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
u Id. at 518.
" 273 U.S. 510 (1927) wherein the Supreme Court declared the fee system utilized
[Vol. 63
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In support of his arguments on this point counsel cites several
cases which involved the right of a defendant to effective
counsel in a criminal case. . . To assert that the Justice
Court, which has a limited civil jurisdiction of $200.00, and
final criminal jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases only, must
be presided over by a person trained in the law, if it is to meet
constitutional standards, is novel indeed. The Court can find
no justification for such a determination."
Though Melikian was a civil suit, the district court left little
doubt that it would rule similarly in a criminal case. The court
offered no authority or rationale for fts position; it noted only
the "novelty" of the claim, as if it were thereby relieved of
evaluating the merits of the plaintiff's contention.
In State ex rel. Moats v. Janco1 the issue was again raised
in an appeal from denial of habeas corpus on a charge of driving
while intoxicated. In answer, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia simply quoted provisions of the state constitu-
tion which set up the state's judicial system and noted the
qualifications for the office of justice of the peace.62 This was
the court's sole authority for the position that neither state nor
federal constitutional due process provisions are offended by
allowing lay judges to sit in criminal cases. The West Virginia
court has recently reaffirmed its position on this issue in State
ex rel. Reece v. Geis. 63
B. Kentucky and California Courts
The first case which did more than summarily dismiss an
appellant's lay judge challenge was Ditty v. Hampton."
Therein, the defendant was convicted of a motor vehicle viola-
tion and disorderly conduct in the Harlan, Kentucky, police
court by a judge who had no legal training.65
Kentucky police judges, in cities other than those of the
first or second class, are not required by law to be licensed
to remunerate judges denied due process because the judge was paid only on conviction
of criminal defendants and thus had a direct and substantial interest in the outcome.
"300 F. Supp. 516, 519 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
" 180 S.E.2d 74 (W.Va. 1971).
2 Id. at 77-78.
198 S.E.2d 211, 213-14 (W. Va. 1973).
"490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot, 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
"Id. at 773.
1975]
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attorneys." The defendant's contention, that due process re-
quired the presiding judge to be "learned in the law," irrespec-
tive of whether the charge was felony or misdemeanor, punish-
able by fine or imprisonment, was upheld by the Harlan Cir-
cuit Court." The circuit court also agreed that the distinction
between classes of cities denied equal protection of the law to
defendants in cities below the second class.
68
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, criticizing the
lower court's reliance on Argersinger v. Hamlin,"9 reversed.
After reiterating the developments in case law wherein the
right to counsel has been extended to criminal defendants, the
Court stated:
Never, on the occasion of any of those decisions, was it even
suggested that the right to counsel carries with it the right to
be tried by a lawyer judge ...
All this is to show that there never has been any thought
that a right to be tried by a lawyer judge grows out of the right
to be defended by a lawyer.
One should note, however, that the issue of lay judges was not
before the Supreme Court in any of the right-to-counsel cases.
This is the most logical reason it was not discussed there. The
assumption that a question not raised and thus not answered
is somehow decided is completely unwarranted.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that because a
judge is not the accused's adversary and is in court neither to
prosecute nor defend, he need not be an attorney.71 Due pro-
cess, said the Court, required only a fair and impartial judge.72
But what possible good to a defendant is the finest lawyer if
his arguments fall on deaf ears? A judge with no legal training
is incapable of weighing the merits of counsel's arguments.
Worse yet, for want of such training, he is often dependent on
6Id.
"Id.
" 407 U.S. 25 (1972) wherein the Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment
right to counsel to all criminal defendants facing any possibility of incarceration.
7 Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
7' Id. at 775.
Id. at 774.
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others for legal guidance. The lay judge's deposition from the
Ditty case reveals precisely this dependency:
Q.73. When you get a motion like that filed, how do you go
about ruling on the motion[,J by common sense?
A. We will take the motion for advisement until I consult
the city attorney.
Q.74. You consult with the prosecuting city attorney before
sustaining or overruling a motion?
A. If it is something I don't understand, I do.
Q.75. If an attorney then comes to your court and makes a
motion, then you take the motion under advisement, consult
the city attorney, and go by what he advised you?
A. Yes.73
The Supreme Court has said that the due process require-
ment of judicial impartiality should be measured by
whether the [judge's] situation is one "which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused. .. .
Can there be any doubt that this standard is violated when a
judge constantly seeks legal guidance from the prosecuting at-
torney who practices before him?
Perhaps the Kentucky Court has forgotten the standard it
set forth for fair trial in Raney v. Commonwealth:
The principle that one accused of crime is entitled to a
fair and impartial trial has become ingrained in Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence.
. .."Perhaps no precise definition can be given it [a fair
trial], but it certainly must be one where the accused's legal
rights are safeguarded and respected. There must not only be
a fair and impartial jury and a learned and upright judge to
instruct the jury and pass on the legal questions, but. . . an
atmosphere of calm. . in which the truth may be received
and given credence .. "I'
" Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 8, Hampton v. Ditty, 414 U.S. 885
(1973) (appeal dismissed as moot).
"I Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972), citing Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (Emphasis added).
73 153 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Ky. 1941) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
1975]
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Interestingly enough, the Kentucky Court said quite emphati-
cally in Ditty that it "cannot conceive of any workable classifi-
cation of persons 'learned and trained in the law' as distin-
guished from licensed attorneys."7
The Ditty court stated that long before Gideon v.
Wainwright, 77 a defendant was entitled as a matter of due pro-
cess to be heard by employed counsel.8 Yet, said the Court, no
suggestion was made that defendant had a right to a lawyer
judge.7" In support of its position, the Court pointed to
Morrissey v. Brewer0 wherein, it argued, the Supreme Court
required only a neutral and detached panel, not judicial offi-
cers, for a parole revocation hearing.
8'
Such reliance on Morrissey is totally unfounded, as a close
reading of the case indicates. The Supreme Court in Morrissey
explicity stated:
We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole
is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply
of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply
to parole revocations. 2
After weighing the interests involved in the parole setting, the
Court found that due process requires a minimal inquiry within
a short time after arrest, where a probable cause determination
should be made.3 Only at this point in the parolee's contact
with the judicial process was the Court suggesting that the
independent officer who made this determination need not be
a judicial officer. 4 In short, Morrissey does not speak to due
process requirements in "criminal prosecutions" as defined by
the Supreme Court.
The Kentucky Court further argued that even though the
71 490 S.W.2d 772,773 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot, 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
7 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
7 Id.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
1, Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
3Id. at 485.
" Id.
[Vol. 63
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Magna Carta provided for justices who know the law,85 the fact
is that England has had, and continues to have, a great many
lay judges."8 But due process rights and notions of fundamental
fairness are not limited to those protections that are in fact
guaranteed at any one time or in any one place. The history of
the fourteenth amendment belies such a notion. English law
clearly demonstrates that one notion of fundamental fairness
was that only those "learned in the law" ought to be judges.
8 7
The fact that the English and American legal systems have not
always achieved that ideal does not render it any less a stan-
dard of fairness.
Relying on Colten v. Kentucky,88 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals next asserted that even if it could be said that a non-
attorney judge violates due process, it would not apply to Ken-
tucky's inferior court system because Kentucky affords
defendants an appeal and trial de novo as a matter of right.8"
If there was such an implication in Colten, it has been entirely
dispelled by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Village of
Monroeville:
This "procedural safeguard" [trial de novo] does not guar-
antee a fair trial in the mayor's court .... Nor, in any event,
may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitution-
ally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to
a neutral and detached judge in the first instance."0
In Roberts v. Noel" the Kentucky Court, in striking down
the justice fee system declared unconstitutional in Tumey v.
Ohio,'2 stated:
[Tihe accused is entitled to be tried before a fair and impar-
"See text accompanying note 3 supra.
" Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
17 See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
" 407 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972) wherein the Supreme Court sanctioned the imposi-
tion of more severe punishment after appeal from an inferior court followed by trial
de novo in the superior court.
" Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
" 296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956).
12 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See note 60 supra.
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tial tribunal in the first instance, where he will not be faced
with the alternative of paying an unjust fine or of resorting
to the delay, annoyance and expense of an appeal ...
[W]e think it clear that the constitutional rights of the de-
fendant should be recognized before he is tried-not after the
judge has decided whether or not he will impose an appeal-
able punishment. 3
The Kentucky Court insisted that the Ditty opinion did not
conflict with its language in Roberts.94 The difference between
the two cases, it reasoned, arose from the fact that in Roberts,
"the system of paying judges only on convictions struck at the
very heart of the due process requirement of fairness . . .- 5
This appears to be an attempt to set up degrees of due process
denial. But seemingly, a practice either violates due process or
it does not. And as the Supreme Court maintained in Ward,
due process must obtain at all levels of the judicial system. 6
Appeals involve the expenses of retaining counsel and lost
time from work. In addition, there is the threat of more severe
punishment being imposed if the appeal results in a de novo
trial.97 In many cases these costs make an appeal from a misde-
meanor financially impractical, effectively closing the door on
defendant's "right" to a trial free from due process defects.
The Kentucky Court finally reached defendant's equal
protection claim. The Court, having decided that an attorney
judge was not a fundamental right, applied the "reasonable-
ness" standard to the legislative classification in question.99
Had the Court agreed with defendant's due process contention,
however, the "strict scrutiny" test would have been employed.
Because few classifications involving fundamental rights could
pass muster under strict scrutiny, it is clear that the defen-
dant's equal protection claim was dependent on the outcome
of his due process claim. Because he failed in the one, he like-
,3 Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Ky. 1956).
11 Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
"Id.
" Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
'7 See note 88 supra.
"Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Ky. 1973), appeal dismissed as moot,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
"Id.
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wise failed in .the other.
The lay judge issue next arose before an intermediate Cali-
fornia appeals court in Gordon v. Justice Court. 100 This decision
offered several arguments that Ditty left untouched and de-
serves analysis even though subsequently reversed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
The intermediate court began by choosing from among a
veritable dictionary of due process definitions one which views
due process components as "settled usages and modes of pro-
ceeding existing in the common and statute law of England."101
The court warned that "[i]f a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."102 Yet the United
States Supreme Court had also offered:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions
of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to
a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be
the limits of fundamental rights. 103
And, in Wolf v. Colorado, "4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Due process of law ... conveys neither formal nor fixed nor
narrow requirements. It is the compendious expression for all
those rights which the court must enforce because they are
basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become petri-
fied as of any one time, even though. . . some may. . . be
called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society
to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and
right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process
is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at
a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of funda-
mental rights.
The petitioners alleged that great likelihood of judicial error
1N 108 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), reu'd, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632
(1974), petition for cert. filed sub non. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (De-
cember 20, 1974) (No. 74-772).
Id. at 916, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
2 Id., citing Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
16 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
I, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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existed in lay judge courts."0 5 They also alleged other abuses
and inadequacies which they supported by submitting affida-
vits to the courts. ' The court labelled these claims "mere
supposition. 10 7 "Generally," said the court, "a showing of
identifiable prejudice is required in due process cases."'' 8 But
the California Supreme Court in reversing Gordon cited a num-
ber of Supreme Court cases which reject the idea that specific
and identifiable prejudice must be shown for a practice to vio-
late due process guarantees.' The California Supreme Court
clearly demonstrated that it has been enough to show that
there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be, or
has not been, obtained. '
The intermediate court also placed great reliance on
Shadwick v. City of Tampa."' Yet Shadwick dealt with a lay-
man's competence to issue arrest warrants, not to preside at
trial.12 The standard of probable cause for arrest is that the
facts must be such that an ordinary and prudent man would
have cause to believe the crime has been committed by the
individual charged."' Seemingly, then, there is no argument
that a lay person could not make such a determination. The
Supreme Court, granting that a layman could issue arrest war-
105 108 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr.
632 (1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373
(December 20, 1974) (No. 74-772).
' Id. at 917, 918.
10 Id. at 918.
"I5 Id. at 922.
10 Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 78,115 Cal. Rptr. 632,638 (1974), petition
for cert. filed sub nom. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974)
(No. 74-772) citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge compensated from fines
he imposed); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (contempt trial before same judge
who presided at grand jury proceeding where alleged contempt occurred); Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (when defendant has no counsel degree of prejudice
unknown); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (use of deputy sheriffs both as jury
custodians and key prosecution witnesses); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (tele-
vised trials); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (pre-trial publicity); Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor-judge whose town revenue was de-
pendent on traffic fines).
"I Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 75-76, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 636 (1974),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20,
1974) (No. 74-772).
II 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
112 Id. at 351.
I,2 Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
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rants, offered that "[a]ll this is not to imply that a judge or
lawyer would not normally provide the most desirable review
of warrant requests.""' 4
Probable cause determinations are a far cry from what is
required of a trial judge. There are no complex procedural or
evidentiary questions involved; no jury to instruct; no guilty
pleas to be received; no sentencing determinations to be made.
Yet the Supreme Court deemed the question in Shadwick wor-
thy of consideration; namely, whether or not a lay person
should be allowed to issue an arrest warrant. It is difficult to
imagine how this decision somehow impliedly approves lay
judges. On the contrary, the Court's suggestion that attorneys
would be preferable for a mere probable cause determination
more logically suggests that the Court may well consider the
duties of a trial judge to be more than a layman could or should
handle.
The intermediate California court's final argument was
that because Supreme Court justices are not required by the
Federal Constitution to have law degrees, it would be bizzare
to require them of justices of the peace." 5 But the law degree
as we know it today was not even in existence when the Consti-
tution was written.1 6 Prior to World War I, most attorneys
received their legal education under the apprenticeship sys-
tem.11 7 And contrary to the court's implication, every justice
who has ever sat on the United States Supreme Court has been
admitted to the practice of law.118 Professor Philip B. Kurland
summed up the "traditional notion" that all Supreme Court
justices must be lawyers:
Obviously, not every member of the bar can qualify for the
post; yet it is equally clear that only lawyers can qualify.
Whatever its powers, the Court's processes are those of judi-
"' Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 353 (1972).
2,5 Gordon v. Justice Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 912, 923-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd,
525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. California v.
Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974) (No. 74-772).
"1 4 L. FRiEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969, at 3197 (1969).
227 Id.
22I L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969 (1969). The author made this determination by reviewing each biographical
sketch in the four volumes of this work.
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cial resolution of controversies between litigants. However
diluted it may have become, the Constitutional requirement
for case or controversy remains. If the controversies calling on
the court's judgment must be resolved in a way that estab-
lishes doctrine for applications beyond the immediate case,
the process for resolution is the time-honored method of ap-
pellate courts and not that of the legislative or executive
branches of the government. Hence the need for lawyers, or
so it has always been assumed." 9
The California Supreme Court, reversing the intermediate
court in Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 0 is the first state court of last
resort to hold that the use of lay judges in criminal prosecutions
violates federal due process guarantees. The strength of the
court's opinion lies in its reasonableness and in the ease with
which one can follow United States Supreme Court decisions
on counsel for criminal defendants to their logical conclusion
in the Gordon case. In Powell v. Alabama,12' Mr. Justice Suth-
erland afforded the California court most compelling reasoning
on which to ground its decision:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissable. . . . [T]hough he not be guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence.
The California Supreme Court acknowledged that other
courts have disagreed with its decision.'2 2 But the court also
I P. Kurland, The Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court Justices,
LAW AND THE SocuL ORDa 183, 189 (1972).
120 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Califor-
nia v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974) (No. 74-772).
121 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
'"2 Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 638 (1974), petition
for cert. filed sub noma. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974)
(No. 74-772).
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noted that "none of these cases convincingly resolved the in-
herent inconsistency in guaranteeing a defendant an attorney
to represent him without providing an attorney judge to preside
at the proceedings." 1
The California court was cognizant that its decision may
cause practical difficulties. Hence, the court limited Gordon's
application, as did the Supreme Court in Argersinger, 24 to
criminal prosecutions in which there is the possibility of im-
prisonment.'2 Also, it provided that the right to a lawyer judge
may be waived in the same manner as the right to counsel.12
6
The court suggested that if no lawyer judge is available in a
particular district, the case may be transferred to, or a judge
assigned from, another judicial district.12
The adjustment that Gordon necessitates, then, is no more
than that which has been mandated by Argersinger.121 In fact,
it is much less burdensome; securing counsel for every criminal
defendant who faces possible imprisonment necessarily re-
quires a greater number of attorneys than does ensuring that
there is one lawyer-judge per judicial district. Yet courts have
generally been reluctant to make decisions that are disruptive
of established systems. Perhaps this is one reason why other
defendants in other courts were afforded no more than sum-
mary treatment or strained constitutional interpretation when
presenting their due process claim of a right to an attorney-
judge.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming majority of United States citizens have
their only contact with the judicial process in the inferior
courts. Thus it is primarily from these courts that people derive
an impression of the entire legal system. Confidence in the
administration of justice cannot help but be eroded by judges
" Id.
*24 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
'' Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 79, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 639 (1974), petition
for cert. filed sub noma. California v. Gordon, 43 U.S.L.W. 3373 (December 20, 1974)
(No. 74-772).
Im Id.
*27 Id.
"I See discussion note 69 supra.
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whose grasp of the law is often rudimentary and before whom
citizens cannot be assured the most basic constitutional protec-
tions. Dean Roscoe Pound has put it well:
Laws may be compared to the formulas of engineers. They
sum up the experience of many courts with many cases and
enable the magistrate to apply that experience subcon-
sciously. So, the formula enables the engineer to make use of
the accumulated experience of past builders, even though he
could not work out a step in its evolution by himself. A lay-
man is no more competent tb construct or to apply the one
formula than the other. Each requires special knowledge and
special preparation. . . . [T]he daily criticism of trained
minds, the knowledge that nothing which does not conform
to the principles and received doctrines of scientific juris-
prudence will escape notice, does more than any other agency
for the everyday purity and efficiency of courts of justice.'
Pound's reasoning appears unassailable; if the United States
Supreme Court agrees, then Gordon heralds a fruition of fair
trial guarantees for all criminal defendants facing the possibil-
ity of incarceration.
Addendum
On February 18, 1975, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the case of California v. Gordon.'30 Though
the Court gave no reason for its denial of the writ, it could
easily have been based on mootness. The defendants in Gordon
initially sought extraordinary pre-trial relief, contending that
their fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection
rights would be violated if they were compelled to stand trial
before a lay judge.' 3' By the time the case reached the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the petitioners had pleaded guilty to lesser
charges before attorney judges. 32 The California Supreme
Court did not find the case moot, stating that it posed "an issue
'29 Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 11 (1956).
'3' 43 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
"' Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72, 74, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 634 (1974).
,32 Id. at 74 n.1, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634 n.1.
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of broad public interest that is likely to recur" and noting the
court's "inherent discretion to resolve [an] issue even though
an event occurring during its pendency would normally render
the matter moot.1' 33 It is well established, however, that the
United States Supreme Court is not bound by a state court's
determination of mootness, and clearly, after the defendants
obtained the relief they were seeking, there was no longer a case
or controversy within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the
United States Constitution.
Another stage of development in the lay judge controversy
was reached on March 21st of this year when the Kentucky
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision in North v. Russell.
13
When defendant North was denied habeas corpus relief by the
Kentucky Court, he appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court vacated the Kentucky decision and
remanded to the Kentucky Court of Appeals because, in his
motion to dismiss or affirm, the Attorney General of Kentucky
admitted that Judge Russell committed gross error in denying
the defendant a jury trial and in incarcerating him, contrary
to Kentucky law.1 35 The Attorney General asked the Supreme
Court to refrain from
... deciding the federal questions involved in this case and
remand the case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals for that
Court's consideration of whether or not appellant should be
granted a writ of habeas corpus solely upon the basis of viola-
tions of Kentucky law which occurred in the course of appel-
lant's trial .... 13
Ignoring the error acknowledged by the Attorney General,
the Kentucky Court, in reaffirming its prior decision on four-
teenth amendment grounds, stated:
Appellate courts have more to do than deal with errors of
which appealing parties make no complaint. It is elementary
that errors of which an aggrieved party is perfectly well aware
but which he chooses not to bring to the attention of the court
are waived. ...
133 Id.
"3 No. 74-723 (Ky. March 21, 1975).
135 Id.
'u Id.
19751
512 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63
The constitutional issue was and is the only issue before
us, and we have decided it adversely to the appellant. So
again, the judgment is affirmed. "7
In light of the Kentucky Court's reaffirmation, attorneys
for defendant North intend to appeal his case once again to the
United States Supreme Court.'38 Because North was convicted
by a lay judge, the mootness problems of the Gordon case are
not present. It remains to be seen, then, if the Supreme Court
will consider the lay judge issue a "substantial federal ques-
tion" and take jurisdiction in the Kentucky case of North v.
Russell.
Katherine R. Lewis
'37 Id.
11 Interview with Dean Hill Rivkin, attorney for Lonnie North, April 14, 1975.
